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Minimalism at War
Cass R. Sunstein*
“The Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility—along with the
necessary power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations. . .
. This Court has . . . held that the President has constitutional authority to protect the national
security and that this authority carries with it broad discretion. . . . [I]t is crucial to recognize that
judicial interference in these domains destroys the purpose of vesting primary responsibility in a
unitary Executive.”1
“The Constitution has never greatly bothered any wartime President.”2
“More importantly, the search for alternatives helps avoid two extreme positions. The first
says that, insofar as war is concerned, the Constitution does not really matter. That is wrong. The
Constitution always matters, perhaps particularly so in times of emergency. The second says that,
insofar as the Constitution is concerned, war or security emergencies do not really matter. That is
wrong too. Security needs may well matter, playing a major role in determining just where the
proper constitutional balance lies.”3

I.

Introduction

Many judges are minimalists; they want to say and do no more than necessary to
resolve cases.4 Judicial minimalism leads in two different directions. First, minimalists
favor shallowness over depth, in the sense they seek to avoid taking stands on the most
deeply contested questions of constitutional law. They attempt to reach incompletely
theorized agreements, in which the most fundamental questions are left undecided. They
prefer outcomes and opinions that can attract support from people with a wide range of
theoretical positions, or with uncertainty about which theoretical positions are best. In
these ways, minimalist judges avoid the largest questions about the meaning of the free
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Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2633, 2675-76 (2004) (Thomas dissenting)
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Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 219 (Doubleday 1962).
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Stephen Breyer, Liberty, Security, and the Courts (April 14, 2003), online at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-15-03.html (visited Dec 1, 2004)
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Minimalism is discussed in general terms in Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism
on the Supreme Court (Harvard 1999).

speech guarantee, or the extent of the Constitution’s protection of “liberty,” or the precise
scope of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
Second, minimalists favor narrowness over width. Proceeding one case at a time,
they seek decisions that resolve the problem at hand without also resolving a series of
other problems that might have relevant differences. In the fashion of common law
courts, minimalist judges prefer to focus on the particular question at issue, refusing to
venture broader judgments that might turn out, on reflection, to be unwarranted.5 With
their emphasis on shallowness and narrowness, some minimalists have a particular
preference for democracy-promoting decisions, certainly as compared to decisions that
simply invalidate what government proposes to do. Democracy-promoting decisions are
those that lead to explicit judgments by democratically accountable actors, above all
Congress.6
Many judges distrust minimalism and prefer maximalism.7 Maximalists reject
shallowness in favor of depth. They are committed to a large-scale theory about the
foundations of constitutional law. They might believe that “originalism” is the best theory
of constitutional meaning, or they might think that the document should be interpreted to
ensure the appropriate operation of democracy itself.8 Typically they believe that their
own theory is correct and that it reflects the right kind of judicial modesty (or, as the case
may be, aggressiveness). What matters is that maximalists want to adopt a foundational
account of one or another kind.
In the same vein, maximalists reject narrowness in favor of width. They believe
that narrow rulings leave a great deal of unpredictability and also promote judicial
discretion.9 They think that firm, clear rules, laid down in advance, are the best way of
5

See Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 80 (Harvard 2003): “The pragmatic judge
tends to favor narrow over broad grounds of decision in the early stages in the development of a legal
doctrine. . . . What the judge has before him is the facts of the particular case, not the facts of future cases.
He can try to imagine what those cases will be like, but the likelihood of error in such an imaginative
projection is great. Working outward, in stages, from the facts before him to future cases with new facts
that may suggest the desirability of altering the contours of the applicable rules, the judge avoids premature
generalization.”
6
This point is elaborated in Sunstein at pp. 26-39 (cited in note 4).
7
See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton 1997).
8
See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard 1983).
9
For an argument in favor of width, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law is a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L
Rev 115 (1989); the best general treatment is Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 NYU L Rev 74
(2000)

2

ensuring clarity for the future—and also of simultaneously constraining and emboldening
judges, encouraging them to protect liberty when the stakes are highest.10 They add that
such rules provide a highly visible background against which other branches of
government can do their work.11
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have raised fresh questions about the
places of minimalism and maximalism in American constitutional law. Those questions
are especially pressing in the face of conflicts between national security and claimed
violations of constitutional rights. Perhaps a form of minimalism makes particular sense
for the resolution of such conflicts; perhaps some kind of maximalism is much better. In
fact we can readily imagine two stylized positions: National Security Maximalism and
Liberty Maximalism.12 National Security Maximalists understand the Constitution to call
for a highly deferential role for the judiciary, above all on the ground that when national
security is threatened, the President must be permitted to do what needs to be done to
protect the country. If he cannot provide that protection, who will? By contrast, Liberty
Maximalists insist that in times of war, at least as much as in times of peace, federal
judges must protect constitutional liberty.13 Indeed, Liberty Maximalists believe that
under circumstances of war, it is all the more important that federal judges take a strong
stand on behalf of liberty.14 If they do not, who will?

10

Scalia, at 119 (cited in note 9).
See id.
12
For excellent and related discussions from which I have learned a great deal, see Eric A. Posner and
Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 Stan L Rev 605 (2003); Richard Pildes and Samuel
Issacharoff, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach
to Right During Wartime, 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (Online Edition) No 1, Article 1 (Jan 2004),
online at
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol5/iss1/art1 (visited Dec 1, 2004). National Security Maximalism is
an extreme version of what Posner and Vermeule call the accommodationist view; Liberty Maximalism is
akin to what they deem the strict enforcement view. Their target is the civil libertarian concern that
accommodationist rulings will weaken liberty during peacetime and that during emergencies, the
government will respond to unjustified public panic. Like Posner and Vermeule, I reject the strict
enforcement view, and for reasons that overlap with theirs. National Security Maximalists are what Pildes
and Issacharoff call Executive Unilateralists; Liberty Maximalists are what Pildes and Issacharoff call Civil
Libertarians. Like Pildes and Issacharoff, and borrowing from their discussion, I stress the use of clear
statement principles.
13
See generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on
Terrorism (WW Norton 2003).
14
This is one reading of Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act
of 1798 to the War on Terrorism (WW Norton 2004).
11
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Of course some people reject both maximalism and minimalism in favor of an
intermediate approach. They might, for example, err in the direction of presidential
power without accepting National Security Maximalism, or err in the direction of
freedom without accepting Liberty Maximalism. But an emphasis on the two forms of
maximalism is helpful for analytic purposes; by exploring the poles, we can have a
clearer sense of what might be wrong with more cautious versions as well. In addition,
the poles have considerable appeal—National Security Maximalism to many federal
judges as well as to the executive branch, Liberty Maximalism to many academic
commentators as well as mission-oriented organizations focussed on the protection of
freedom. As we shall see, unmistakable forms of National Security Maximalism, rather
than an intermediate approach, can be found in several places in recent years.
This Article has two central purposes. The first is to reject both forms of
maximalism and to specify and support a minimalist approach to intrusions on freedom
amidst war. The second is to suggest that to a remarkable degree, an identifiable form of
minimalism captures the practices of the American courts when national security is
threatened.15 Prominent uses of minimalism can be found during the Civil War, World
War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the contemporary war on terrorism. In general,
the Supreme Court has adopted a form of minimalism having three central components: a
requirement of clear congressional authorization for executive action intruding on
interests with a claim to constitutional protection16; an insistence on fair hearings,
including access to courts, for those deprived of liberty; and judicial decisions that are
themselves shallow and narrow and that therefore impose modest constraints on the
future. The minimalist pattern unifies an extraordinary number of seemingly disparate
decisions, including those in the recent past.17 Indeed, the Court’s notorious decisions
involving the exclusion and detention of Japanese-Americans during World War II
should be seen not as blind deference to executive power, but as a tribute to

15

An important aspect of minimalism, requiring congressional authorization, is traced in some detail in
Pildes and Issacharoff, Civil Libertarianism (cited in note xx).
16
The notion of authorization raises a number of complexities, on which see Curtis Bradley and Jack
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, Harv L Rev (forthcoming 2005); I deal
with some of those complexities below, see TAN infra.
17
See Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004); Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2633 (2004).
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minimalism—requiring clear congressional support for deprivations of liberty by the
executive, and permitting those deprivations only if that support can be found.18
The Court’s own practices help to identify serious problems with both forms of
maximalism. If the nation is genuinely threatened, Liberty Maximalism runs into two
difficulties. First, it is unrealistic, certainly in its most ambitious forms; judges simply
will not protect liberty with the same aggressiveness when a country faces a serious threat
to its survival.19 By itself this is a large objection to Liberty Maximalism. “Ought implies
can,” and it is unhelpful to urge courts to adopt a role that they will predictably refuse to
assume.20 Second, Liberty Maximalism is undesirable. The government’s power to
intrude on liberty depends on the strength of the justifications it can muster on behalf of
the intrusion.21 When security is at risk, government has greater justifications than when
it is not. Hence it is correct to say, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, that it “is neither
desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a position in
wartime as it does in peacetime.”22
None of this means that in times of war, the government may proceed however it
wishes or act in blatant violation of constitutional commands. Interferences with freedom
of speech, for example, should be regarded with great skepticism, simply because they
eliminate the principal method by which democracies correct themselves.23 As we shall
see, courts do, and should, take steps to ensure against arbitrary detentions. In American

18

See below.
See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Silence During War (unpublished manuscript 2003) (offering
quantitative study of judicial deference during war); William Rehnquist, All the Laws But One (Knopf
1998).
20
Of course I am using the term “can” to suggest willingness, rather than feasibility. There is nothing in the
structure of the universe that would prevent courts from adopting Liberty Maximalism, and hence “can”
operates, in this context, in a relatively weak sense. There is no point in asking courts to assume a posture
that they will predictably refuse.
21
See Breyer, Liberty at 3 (cited in note xx): “The value does not change; the circumstances change,
thereby shifting the point at which a proper balance is struck. That is what happens in wartime when more
severe restrictions may be required.”
22
Id at 224-25.
23
See Stone, Perilous Times, (cited in note 14); see also Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 Harv L Rev 16, 149 (2002): “[M]atters of daily life constantly test
judges’ ability to protect democracy, but judges meet their supreme test in situations of war and terrorism.
The protection of every individual’s human rights is a much more formidable duty in times of war and
terrorism than in times of peace and security. . . . As a Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, how should I
view my role in protecting human rights given this situation? I must take human rights seriously during
times of both peace and conflict.”
19
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law, it cannot be said that “inter arma silent leges” (amidst war laws are silent).24 But as a
general approach for courts in wartime, Liberty Maximalism is a nonstarter. It is too
broad, and too neglectful of legitimate government interests, to have a serious claim to
our attention.
But its principal competitor, National Security Maximalism, runs into serious
problems as well. First, its reading of the Constitution, typically emphasizing the
President’s role as Commander in Chief, is tendentious; some of the document’s
provisions can be taken to support National Security Maximalism, but they need not be
read in that fashion. In fact they are more plausibly seen to ensure a shared division of
authority between the President and Congress, above all because they retain the role of
Congress as the nation’s lawmaker. Second, National Security Maximalism neglects the
fact that under many circumstances, the executive branch is most unlikely to strike the
right balance between security and liberty.25 A primary task of the President is to keep the
citizenry safe, and any error on that count is likely to produce extremely high political
sanctions. For this reason, the President has a strong incentive to take precautions even if
they are excessive and even unconstitutional. Internal deliberations within the executive
branch are more likely than not to aggravate the problem, leading not to sensible checks
and balances, but to a tendency toward a degree of extremism.
Of course unjustified intrusions on liberty can and do produce political retribution
as well. But whether they do so depends on their incidence; and here is a further problem
for National Security Maximalism. Political safeguards are most reliable if the intrusions
severely burden many people at once. Such general intrusions are unlikely to be tolerated
unless citizens can be convinced that they are necessary. But if the intrusions are faced by
an identifiable few, political checks will not ensure that they are justified. On the
contrary, political pressures might well favor them even if they are not.
In some circumstances, then, the executive is likely to adopt steps that sacrifice
liberty for no adequate reason.26 But judicial intervention is no panacea, for courts have
institutional weaknesses of their own. Worst of all, they lack relevant information and
24

Cicero, Oratio Pro Annio Milone IV; see Rehnquist, All the Laws at 224 (cited in note xx).
For countless examples, see Stone, Perlious Times (cited in note 14).
26
See id; Epstein et al., Supreme Silence (cited in note xx); and Rehnquist, All the Laws (cited in note xx),
for many illustrations.
25
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hence they may not know whether an interference with liberty is actually justified.
Because their historic mission is to protect individual liberty, they may give insufficient
attention to the variables on the other side.27 But none of this means that courts cannot
play a productive role. I investigate here three ingredients of a minimalist approach that
seems to me to have significant promise, and to represent a distillation of much of the
practice of American courts over the last century and more:
1. Clear congressional authorization. Courts should require clear congressional
authorization before the executive intrudes on interests that have a strong claim to
constitutional protection.28 As a general rule, the executive should not be permitted to act
on its own.29 The underlying ideas here are twofold: a requirement of congressional
authorization provides a check on unjustified intrusions on liberty, and such authorization
is likely to be forthcoming when there is a good argument for it. A requirement of clear
authorization therefore promotes liberty without compromising legitimate security
interests.30
2. Hearing rights. Courts should insist, whenever possible, on the core principle
of the due process clause: Before anyone is deprived of liberty, some kind of procedure
must be put in place to ensure against erroneous deprivations. This requirement protects
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Notably, however, there appears to be no evidence of judicial overprotection of civil liberties in the
nation’s long history. See Stone, Perilous Times (cited in note 14). Compare the use of the Precautionary
Principle in environmental regulation, which calls for margins of safety to protect against harmful
outcomes. See Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (forthcoming 2005), for
general discussion. When national security is in danger, governments officials are engaging in a form of
risk management, and it should not be surprising to find that they often adopt a kind of Precautionary
Principle. Stone, Perilous Times (cited in note xx), may be seen as a catalogue of instances in which
something akin to that principle was employed to produce many unjustifiable intrusions on liberty; in this
sense, it is a cousin to Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True: A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental, Health, and
Safety Issues (Harvard 1995), which catalogues a number of cases in which unjustifiable steps were taken
in response to imagined environmental concerns.
28
An early version of this idea can be found in Masses Publishing Co v Patten, 244 F 535 (SDNY 1917),
discussed below.
29
Complexities emerge when the President’s inherent authority is plausibly involved. See Loving v United
States, 517 US 748 (1996).
30
I discuss below the complex question whether clear authorization is sufficient as well as necessary; the
short version is that outside of the egregious cases, courts should ordinarily respect the shared views of
Congress and the President.
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against unjustified imprisonment, which counts as the most serious infringement of civil
liberty.31
3. Judicial self-discipline. Courts should discipline themselves through narrow,
incompletely theorized decisions. Such decisions tend to ensure against dual risks:
judicial overreaching, in the form of limits on executive power that will ultimately prove
unjustified; and excessive judicial modesty, in the form of decisions that, in the heat of
the moment, lead to large-scale intrusions on liberty.32 When vindicating minimalist
principle (2), for example, judges can refuse to specify the precise procedure that must be
used, allowing the executive (for example) to use military tribunals or otherwise to depart
from ordinary adjudicative procedures, so long as the rudiments of due process are
observed.
These three ideas can be unified under the general rubric of Due Process Writ
Large. The requirement of congressional authorization provides a degree of procedural
protection at the structural level. By mandating action from an institution that is both
diverse and deliberative, that requirement offers a procedural safeguard against illconsidered intrusions into the domain of liberty. The requirement of a minimal hearing
reflects the most familiar aspect of the due process guarantee. The requirement of narrow
and shallow rulings from the courts applies due process principles to judges themselves,
by ensuring that those not before the court will be provided with an opportunity to be
heard.
All of these principles make sense not only for courts, but also for constitutional
judgments within the executive branch and Congress in times of war. Judges are hardly
the only people involved in constitutional interpretation. The executive branch, for
example, would do well to seek congressional authorization for intrusions on
constitutionally sensitive interests, to ensure hearings for those deprived of liberty, and to
rely on narrow and incompletely theorized judgments about issues at the frontiers of
constitutional law.

31

The hearing right is a modest one, because as I am understanding it here, it requires a proceeding only to
determine whether the executive has deprived someone of liberty on the basis of facts that under relevant as
a matter of existing law.
32
See Epstein et al., Supreme Silence (cited in note xx), for details.
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Of course minimalism is not always the appropriate course for federal judges or
for anyone else.33 Predictability can be extremely important, and in some contexts
minimalism cannot be tolerated, simply because it sacrifices rule of law values for no
sufficient reason. And of course general principles cannot resolve concrete cases;
everything turns on the particular intrusion and its underlying justification. Sometimes
the President is constitutionally permitted to act on his own34; sometimes hearings need
not be held35; sometimes judges should rule broadly. A committed minimalist will insist
on these very points, contending that it is too ambitious to insist, all of the time, on
congressional authorization, hearings, and narrow and incompletely theorized rulings.
But when national security and liberty are in tension, the three principles provide the best
general orientation.
This remainder of this Article comes in three parts. Part II sketches the role of
National Security Maximalism in the war on terror. It shows that in recent years, this way
of proceeding has had a prominent place in the Department of Justice, the Supreme
Court, and federal courts of appeals. Part III outlines the problems with National Security
Maximalism, including its tendentious reading of the Constitution and its failure to
appreciate the relevant incentives on the part of the executive branch. Part IV sketches
the minimalist alternative, with its emphasis on clear statement principles, hearing rights,
and narrow, shallow judicial judgments.
II.

National Security Maximalism

“We are now confronted by a profoundly disturbing trend in our national political life: the
growing tendency of the judicial branch to inject itself into areas of executive action originally
assigned to the discretion of the president. These encroachments include some of the most
fundamental aspects of the president’s conduct of the war on terrorism.”36
“But the ‘law’ which this prisoner is convicted of disregarding is not found in an act of
Congress, but in a military order. Neither the Act of Congress nor the Executive Order, nor both
together, would afford a basis for this conviction. It rests on the orders of General Dewitt.”37

33

See Vermeule, 75 NYU L Rev 74 (cited in note xx).
See, for example, Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 US 763 (1950).
35
See id.
36
Attorney General John Ascroft, quoted in Terry Frieden, Ashcroft: “Activist” Judges Can Put Nation’s
Security At Risk (Nov 12, 2004), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/12/ashcroft.judges/index.html (visited Dec 1, 2004).
37
Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson dissenting).
34
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It should be unsurprising to find that in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11,
National Security Maximalism has obtained a great deal of support. To be sure, the
Supreme Court has refused to accept it, at least thus far.38 But the basic approach can be
found in many places.
A. The Department of Justice
In recent years, the most visible moment for National Security Maximalism came
from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, with its 2002
memorandum on the legality of coerced interrogation.39 The most remarkable aspect of
the memorandum is its suggestion that as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the
President of the United States has the inherent authority to torture suspected terrorists, so
as to make it constitutionally unacceptable for Congress to ban the practice of torture.40
The Office of Legal Counsel emphasized that “the President enjoys complete discretion
in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority and in conducting operations against
hostile forces.”41 In addition, the Office of Legal Counsel insisted that a core function of
the Commander in Chief includes interrogation of the enemy.42 Because of “the
President’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign against al
Qaeda and its allies,” congressional enactments “must be construed as not applying to”
interrogations undertaken as part of the President’s Commander in Chief authority.43
“Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants would
violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander in Chief authority in the
38

See, for example, Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2633, 2674 (2004); Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004).
See Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re:
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 USC 2340-2340A (August 1, 2002) (copy on file with
author). This was the most visible moment for National Security Maximalism, but perhaps not the most
extreme one. In the Padilla case, the President claimed that, as Commander in Chief, he had the inherent
power to order military authorities to seize an American citizen in the United States without any judicial
approval and to hold him indefinitely, incommunicado, with no access to a lawyer, a court, family, or
friends, and without even informing his family or friends what they had done with him. I discuss Padilla
below.
40
Id at 31.
41
Id at 33.
42
Id at 38.
43
Id at 34. To be sure, the position of the Department of Justice was stated with a degree of tentativeness,
with the suggestion that the congressional ban on torture “might” be unconstitutional in the context of
battlefield interrogations. So phrased, the suggestion is a form of minimalism, asking for avoidance of the
constitutional issue by reading the statute so as not to intrude on the President’s authority as Commander in
Chief. But the general impression is that the ban probably should be regarded as unconstitutional.
39
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President.”44 Hence coercive interrogation, including torture, must be permitted if the
President wants to engage in it.
The Office of Legal Counsel is part of the executive branch, and one of its major
functions is to protect the constitutional prerogatives of the President, especially those
prerogatives that are associated with the Commander in Chief power. Generous
interpretations of the President’s prerogatives should be expected from any office within
the Department of Justice, above all when national security is at risk. But in its
endorsement of presidential power, the memorandum on coerced interrogation went well
beyond ordinary practice. To be sure, the President has inherent authority to oversee
battlefield operations, and Congress has limited power to control such operations. The
President also has the inherent authority to conduct interrogations amidst war. But to say
the least, it is unusual to say that this authority includes the power to torture people when
Congress has expressly said otherwise. The power to command the armed forces is not
easily taken to include “inherent” power to torture enemy combatants. Even if it does
include that power, it is hard to contend that Congress cannot provide protection against
torture.45
Whatever one’s ultimate judgment on the merits, the memorandum of the Office
of Legal Counsel provides a dramatic example of National Security Maximalism—one
that may be taken to presage future understandings if that approach ultimately prevails.
B. Justice Clarence Thomas in Hamdi
In recent Supreme Court decisions involving the war on terrorism, National
Security Maximalism failed to attract a majority opinion.46 But it made a conspicuous
appearance in a remarkable dissenting opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas in the Hamdi
case.47 I will turn to the particular facts of the case in due course. For the moment, note

44

Id at 39.
See the discussion of Justice Jackson’s views in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579
(1952) (“The Steel Seizure Case”), explored below. Note that in some applications, the Commander in
Chief power is more plausibly read to include the power to torture – when, for example, torture is deemed
necessary to prevent an imminent attack on American troops. But even here, Congress almost certainly has
the authority to forbid the practice of torture.
46
See Rasul, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004); Rumsfeld v Padilla, 124 S Ct 2711 (2004); Hamdi, 124 S Ct 2633
(2004).
47
Hamdi, 124 S Ct 2633, 2674 (2004).
45
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that Justice Thomas emphasized, very broadly, that any constitutional judgment in this
domain should consider “basic principles of the constitutional structure as it relates to
national security and foreign affairs.”48 In his view, the Constitution accords to the
President the “primary responsibility . . . to protect the national security and to conduct
the nation’s foreign relations.”49 Hence judicial judgments should be made against the
backdrop set by the President’s inherent and broadly discretionary power to protect
national security.50
With respect to the courts, Justice Thomas contended, “it is crucial to recognize
that judicial interference in these domains destroys the purpose of vesting primary
responsibility in a unitary Executive.”51 Judges “lack the relevant information and
expertise to second-guess determinations made by the President . . . .”52 In fact
congressional grants of power should be construed generously on the President’s behalf,
rather than narrowly, so as to fit with institutional limits on the power of the judiciary.53
Because the executive branch of the federal government “has an overriding interest in
protecting the Nation,” it can invoke that interest to justify depriving people of liberty.54
In fact Justice Thomas argued in favor of broad constructions of congressional grants of
authority partly to avoid constitutional difficulties: “Although the President very well
may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our troops, I agree with the
plurality that we need not decide that question because Congress has authorized the
President to do so.”55
Justice Thomas’ opinion is a form of National Security Maximalism because of its
breadth and ambition. There is no effort here to offer a cautious ruling tailored to the
facts of the particular case. On the contrary, Justice Thomas speaks generally about the
“primary responsibility” of the President in the domain of “national security.” In addition,
he adopts a kind of clear statement principle in favor of presidential authority, suggesting,

48

Id at 2675.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id at 2676.
52
Id.
53
Id at 2677.
54
Id at 2685.
55
Id at 2679.
49
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at least implicitly, that statutes should be read in a way that does not conflict with the
President’s inherent authority. But from a reading of the Constitution alone, it would not
be entirely clear whether the President or the Congress has primary responsibility in the
domain of national security—an issue to which I will return. The important point is that
Justice Thomas offers a distinctive vision of the constitutional structure, one that accords
principal authority to the President and thus exemplifies National Security Maximalism.
C. National Security Maximalism on the United States Court of Appeals: The President
and “The War Power”
In the years since the September 11 attacks, National Security Maximalism has
played a large role on the lower federal courts.56 Two circuits have decided most of the
cases involving a conflict between national security and individual liberty: the United
States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and for the Fourth Circuit. Both
have shown a remarkable tendency toward National Security Maximalism. In nearly
every case in which a serious challenge was mounted to the power of the President, the
President has prevailed in the courts of appeals.57 Let us investigate the details.
1. The D.C. Circuit. One of the most strikingly maximalist decisions by the D.C.
Circuit is Al Odah v United States,58 reversed by the Supreme Court.59 In its exceedingly
ambitious ruling, the court held that aliens captured outside of the United States have no
rights under the due process clause. The Court said that the Guantanamo Bay detainees
were, in law, analogous to German prisoners captured on the battlefield in World War II.
The court acknowledged that Guantanamo Bay is controlled by the United States
military, but it insisted on the irrelevance of this fact because Cuba has sovereignty over

56

The principal exception is Padilla v Rumsfeld, 352 F3d 695 (2d Cir 2003), in which the Court held that
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the area.60 Broadly reading Supreme Court precedents, the Court ruled in favor of
executive discretion.61
A concurring opinion by Judge Randolph (who wrote the majority opinion as
well) went further still, resolving several issues that it was not necessary for him to
discuss. Consider his confessedly maximalist opening sentence: “I write separately to add
two other grounds for rejecting the detainee’s non-habeas claims.”62 The fundamental
motivation for his separate opinion seemed to be captured by his final sentence: “The
level of threat a detainee poses to United States interests, the amount of intelligence a
detainee might be able to provide, the conditions under which the detainee may be
willing to cooperate, the disruption visits from family members and lawyers might
cause—these types of judgments have traditionally been left to the exclusive discretion of
the Executive Branch, and there they should remain.”63 Here is an explicit endorsement
of National Security Maximalism.
Other rulings within the D.C. Circuit fall in the same category. In Center for
National Security Studies v Department of Justice,64 a divided court of appeals permitted
an extraordinary level of secrecy from the executive branch. A number of public interest
groups invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the common law, and the First
Amendment to require the government to release information about those who had been
detained in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The requested information
included names, dates of arrest and release, and reasons for detention. The disclosure
request had a strong democratic justification: Evaluation of the executive’s behavior
could not easily come from a public not provided with this information. In ruling that
disclosure was not required, the court relied on a broad interpretation of exemption 7(A)
of FOIA, which exempts “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes
. . . to the extent that the production could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings.”65
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As Judge Tatel emphasized in dissent, the court’s interpretation of this exemption
was exceptionally deferential to the government’s vague statements about potential
harms.66 The court was entirely aware of this point. In language that is closely linked to
Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion in Hamdi, the court emphasized that “the judiciary
owes some measure of deference to the executive in cases implicating national security, a
uniquely executive purview. . . . We have consistently reiterated the principle of
deference to the executive in the FOIA context when national security concerns are
implicated. . . . [W]e have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to
the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”67
Indeed, the court went so far as to comment on the distinctive nature of the current threat:
“America faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities far
beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore.”68 In fact the court insisted that deference
was “mandated by the separation of powers,”69 suggesting that disclosure under FOIA
would raise constitutional problems. The court left no doubt about the motivation for its
action: “We are in accord with several federal courts that have wisely respected the
executive’s judgment in prosecuting the national response to terrorism.”70 What is most
noteworthy about the decision, then, is not the outcome, but the broad pronouncements
about the need to defer to the executive.
Within the District of Columbia, the district courts have shown a similar tendency
to National Security Maximalism. Consider, for example, ACLU v Department of
Justice,71 in which organizations sought information involving the government’s use of §
215 of the Patriot Act. Section 215 gives the FBI broad power to “make an application
for an order requiring production of any tangible things . . . for an investigation to obtain
foreign intelligence information . . . or to protect against international terrorism.”72 In
particular, the plaintiffs sought to use FOIA to find out (1) the total number of § 215
requests received by the National Security Law Unit of the FBI and (2) any and all
records relating to § 215. Notwithstanding the fact that the Department of Justice had
66
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previously made several disclosures of its behavior under the Patriot Act, the court ruled
broadly that the national security exemption of FOIA justified the failure to disclose the
information. It acknowledged that the “issue is hardly free from doubt,” but ruled for the
government “because it [was] mindful of the ‘long-recognized deference to the executive
on national security issues.’”73 Thus the court deferred, not to specific explanations by
the executive, but to the vague claims that release of the number of § 215 field requests
“poses the continuing potential to harm our national security by enabling our adversaries
to conduct their intelligence or international terrorist activities more securely.”74 The
court’s willingness to embrace National Security Maximalism is best understand in light
of a background principle in favor of executive power in the domain of national security.
A similar approach can be found in Edmonds v Department of Justice.75 There the
court gave an exceedingly broad reading to the “state secrets privilege” so as to dismiss a
Privacy Act claim brought by a self-styled whistleblower at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. One of the most striking parts of the court’s opinion came in a footnote, in
which it addressed the possibility of staying the case rather than dismissing it: “This is
due not only to the nature of the information, but also because the imminent threat of
terrorism will not be eliminated anytime in the foreseeable future, but is an endeavor that
will consume out nation’s attention indefinitely.”76 Under FOIA, then, National Security
Maximalism has been explicitly endorsed within the D.C. Circuit, in holdings that fit well
with the general approach in Al Odah.
2. The Fourth Circuit. Broad rulings in favor of executive authority have also
come from the Fourth Circuit.77 The most prominent of these is Hamdi v Rumsfeld.78
There the Court held that enemy combatants, captured on the battlefield, could be
detained indefinitely and without trial, even if they were American citizens. In so ruling,
the Court relied largely on the President’s power as Commander in Chief, contending that
this power includes “the authority to detain those captured in armed struggle” and also
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“to deport or detain alien enemies during the duration of hostilities” and “to confiscate or
destroy enemy property.”79
The central question in the case involved the procedural protection, if any, that
would accompany the exercise of the Commander in Chief power. The Court emphasized
the need to defer to the President: “The Constitution’s allocation of the warmaking
powers reflects not only the expertise and experience lodged within the executive, but
also the more fundamental truth that those branches most accountable to the people
should be the ones to undertake the ultimate protection and to ask the ultimate sacrifice
from them.”80 Hence deference to the executive would be the basic rule.81 The court was
aware that in denying fair procedure, the President was doing something unusual. But
changed circumstances justified this step. “As the nature of threats to America evolves,
along with the means of carrying those threats out, the nature of enemy combatants may
change also. In the face of such change, separation of powers does not deny the executive
branch the essential tool of adaptability.”82
Indeed the Court said that the source of the detention was not a statute, but
“Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution, wherein the President is given the war
power.”83 (I will return to this important statement in due course.) Deference to the
President stems from this explicit grant of authority. So long as a detention “is one
legitimately made pursuant to the war powers,” it must be respected.84 A general
statement on the part of the executive, supporting the claim that a citizen was detained in
the course of war and qualified as an enemy combatant, would be sufficient.85 The court
left no doubt that this conclusion stemmed from National Security Maximalism: “The
constitutional allocation of war powers affords the President extraordinarily broad
authority as Commander in Chief and compels courts to assume a deferential posture.”86
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That deference required the conclusion that Hamdi could be held indefinitely,
even after the end of the relevant hostilities.87 In reaching this conclusion, the court
referred to the judgments of the executive branch, without even pausing to consider what
kind of authorization Congress had given it.88

III.

Three Problems with National Security Maximalism

“In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of
guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well entrusted to
the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain security. For
reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of Government asked to counter a serious threat
is not the branch on which to rests the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the
will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory. . . . A reasonable balance is more likely to
be reached on the judgment of a different branch. . . . Hence the need for an assessment by
Congress before citizens are subject to lockup, likewise the need for a clearly expressed
congressional resolution of the competing claims.”89
“Judges are sometimes called upon to be courageous, because they must sometimes stand up
to what is generally supreme in a democracy: the popular will. Their most significant roles in our
system are to protect the individual criminal defendant against the occasional excesses of that
popular will, and to preserve the checks and balances within our constitutional system that are
precisely designed to inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of that popular will.”90

In the abstract, National Security Maximalism has a great deal of appeal. Far
more than Congress, the President is in a position to act quickly and decisively to protect
the citizenry. He is also likely to be able to acquire relevant information about what must
be done and about when to do it. Because the President is Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, Congress cannot override the President’s judgments about how to carry
out a lawful war. Justice Thomas correctly emphasizes that Alexander Hamilton defended
the creation of a “unitary executive” as a means of ensuring energy, coordination, and
dispatch in the presidency.91 These qualities are relevant above all in time of war. By
contrast, courts lack good tools for assessing the President’s claims of military necessity.
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At least equally important, judicial errors may turn out to be disastrous rather than
merely harmful. To be sure, American practice suggests that judges are most unlikely to
err by protecting civil liberties; in our history, it is hard to find even a single case in
which judicial protection of freedom seriously damaged national security. But if Liberty
Maximalism were accepted, some such errors would become far more probable. In
ordinary contexts, even those that involve criminal justice, the stakes are not nearly so
high. There is every reason for courts to avoid a decision that leads to freedom for
terrorists, or to disclosure of information that helps those who wants to kill Americans.
Structural concerns, along with simple prudence, argue in favor of considerable judicial
deference to presidential choices when national security is at risk. These points provide
important cautionary notes; they help to explain why Liberty Maximalism is senseless.
But for several reasons, National Security Maximalism should itself be rejected.
A. Tendentious Readings of the Constitution
If National Security Maximalism were mandated by the Constitution, judges
would be bound to follow it. But far from requiring National Security Maximalism, the
Constitution is best read to forbid it.
No one doubts that the President has considerable power in the domain of national
security. I have emphasized that under Article II, he is explicitly authorized to be
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” He is allowed “to
make Treaties,” at least when two-thirds of the senators concur. He is authorized to
“appoint Ambassadors” and “other public Ministers and Consuls.” He “shall receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.” But none of this supports Justice Thomas’
suggestion that the President has “primary responsibility—along with the necessary
power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations.”
Nor does anything in the document support the Fourth Circuit’s suggestion that under
Article II, “the President is given the war power.” On the contrary, that view is a
tendentious reading of the legal materials. To see why, let us turn to Article I.
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Perhaps most notably, Congress, rather than the President, has the power “to
declare War.”

92

The Constitution also grants Congress, not the President, the power “to

raise and support Armies.” It authorizes Congress “to provide and maintain a Navy.” In a
formulation that bears on the President’s supposedly inherent power to torture, and that
much complicates any claims about the broad power of the Commander in Chief, the
founding document permits Congress to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces.” It is Congress that is authorized to raise funds to “provide
for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.” Congress, rather than
the President, is empowered to “regulate Commerce with foreign nations.” Congress is
also authorized to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offenses against the Law of Nations,” and also to “make Rules concerning Captures
on Land and Water.” It is under Article I, not Article II, that the Constitution allows
suspension of habeas corpus “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.” The fact that the Suspension Clause can be found in Article I tends to
suggest that Congress, not the President, is entitled to suspend the writ.93
In this light, the Constitution does not repose in the President anything like the
general authority “to protect the national security.” On the contrary, the more natural
reading of the document is that protection of national security is parceled out between
Congress and the President -- and that if either has the dominant role, it is the national
lawmaker. To be sure, the Commander in Chief Clause does give the President the
authority to direct the armed forces, an expansive authority94; but even that authority is
subject to legislative constraints, because Congress controls the budget and because
Congress can choose not to declare war. And if Congress refuses either to authorize the
use of force or to declare war, the President is generally not—on the best reading of the
document—entitled to commence hostilities.95 The Commander in Chief Clause allows
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the President to manage wars; but it does not give him “the war power.” All of this means
that National Security Maximalism cannot claim a strong constitutional pedigree.
Of course, the constitutional text is hardly all there is to our constitutional
tradition.96 In the domain of separation of powers, historical practices and changes over
time are highly relevant. As Justice Frankfurter contended, “It is an inadmissibly narrow
conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution
and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”97 In this context, an
understanding of that “gloss” greatly favors the President. There can be no doubt that for
questions of national security, the President has assumed authority that the text alone
might not sanction. The power to make war is a leading example; the President has long
engaged in military actions without the kind of legislative authorization that Article I
appears to require.98
Historical “glosses” on constitutional text might well be taken to argue in the
direction of National Security Maximalism. They make it plausible to contend that the
President has more authority, in the domain of national security, than the document alone
appears to contemplate. Undoubtedly the increasing power of the President is largely a
product of functional considerations having to do with the rise of the United States as an
international power and the growing need for energy and dispatch. But even when the
document is thus glossed, it remains tendentious to contend that when the nation is at
risk, the President must be in charge of the apparatus of government. To say this is to
reject a constitutional accommodation that, by text and tradition, unambiguously retains
Congress’ role as the nation’s lawmaker.
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B. The Incentives of the Executive Branch
The second problem with National Security Maximalism is that it understates the
risks of unlimited presidential authority. The executive branch perceives protection of the
nation’s security as one of its principal tasks, in part because political retribution will fall
swiftly on any President who fails in that task. When the nation is under threat, the
executive will naturally take precautionary steps to reduce the risks. So far, so good. But
recall here Attorney General Biddle’s suggestion: “The Constitution has never greatly
bothered any wartime President.”99 The question is whether internal dynamics, or
external checks, will help to ensure that the precautionary steps are optimal rather than
excessive. For two reasons, National Security Maximalism is far too optimistic on that
count.100
1. Internal dynamics, unitariness, and group polarization. Internal dynamics
present a serious problem, precisely because the executive branch is designed so as to be
neither diverse nor deliberative, certainly as compared with the national legislature. As
Justice Thomas emphasized in Hamdi, the executive branch is “unitary” in principle101; it
is run by a single person, and he is constitutionally entitled to fill his branch with likeminded people. And here is a real difficulty. One of the most robust findings in modern
social science is that after deliberation, like-minded people tend to end up thinking a
more extreme version of what they thought before deliberation began.102 Ordinary
processes within the executive branch are all too likely to produce not careful
investigation of alternatives, but a heightened version of what executive branch officials
believed in advance.103 As a result, liberty might well be at risk.104
Of course a presidential disposition in favor of liberty over security105 can alter
this dynamic. Suppose, for example, that the President and his advisers believe that some
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national security risk is trivial while a small group within the administration disagrees. It
is predictable that precautionary steps will not be taken even though they are justified.106
Deliberative processes among like-minded people can produce excessive rather than
insufficient concern for liberty.107 In addition, a system of internal checks and balances
can alter the dynamic by which groups end up amplifying their antecedent tendencies.108
Different agencies and departments often have different agendas and interests; consider
the notorious fact that the Department of State and the Department of Defense often
disagree on issues of both law and policy. A President can certainly take steps to ensure a
diversity of views; it is possible to structure executive branch processes so as to create
internal safeguards.109
My only suggestion here is that there can be no assurance that the executive
branch, consisting of people who work under a single president and usually seeking
internal consensus, will consider the relevant factors in a way that produces sensible
outcomes. If the

outlook of the President and his closest advisers includes a

predisposition toward aggressive steps to counteract national security risks, even at the
expense of liberty, the executive branch is likely to blunder. History offers countless
illustrations.110
As an example of a failure of deliberation within the executive branch, consider
the account in the 2004 report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which
explicitly accused the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of groupthink, in which the
agency’s predisposition to find a serious threat from Iraq led it to fail to explore
alternative possibilities or to obtain and use the information that it actually held.111 In the
Committee’s view, the CIA “demonstrated several aspects of group think: examining few
alternatives, selective gathering of information, pressure to conform within the group or
withhold criticism, and collective rationalization.”112 Thus the agency showed a
“tendency to reject information that contradicted the presumption” that Iraq had weapons
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of mass destruction.113 Because of that presumption, the agency failed to use its own
formalized methods “to challenge assumptions and ‘group think,’ such as ‘red teams,’
‘devil’s advocacy,’ and other types of alternative or competitive analysis.”114 Above all,
the Committee’s conclusions emphasize the CIA’s failure to elicit and aggregate
information. Through processes of this sort, it is easy to imagine that liberty could be
sacrificed in favor of national security, even if there is no adequate justification for the
sacrifice.
The claim of the Senate Select Committee is a remarkable and even uncanny echo
of one that followed the 2003 investigation of failures at NASA, stressing that agency’s
similar failure to elicit competing views, including those based on information held by
agency employees.115 The Columbia Accident Investigation Board explicitly attributed
the accident to NASA’s unfortunate culture, one that does too little to elicit information.
In the Board’s words, NASA lacks “checks and balances.”116 It pressures people to
follow a “party line.”117 At NASA, “it is difficult for minority and dissenting opinions to
percolate up through the agency’s hierarchy”118 -- even though, the Board contended,
effective safety programs require the encouragement of minority opinions and bad news.
Here too the unitariness of the relevant agency was a central source of the problem.
These examples of executive branch failure reflect the process known as group
polarization, through which like-minded people often go to unjustified extremes.119 If
those within an executive agency believe that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, that
very belief is likely to be heightened after members have started to talk. And if those
within the executive branch think that some abridgement of civil liberties is necessary
and desirable as a precautionary measure, internal deliberations are likely to produce
polarization in the direction of the antecedent belief. Of course internal deliberations will
not produce a final outcome if external political checks exist; an outraged public is often
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able to discipline presidential choices. Sometimes political checks will ensure against
unjustified intrusions on liberty. But to understand this point, we have to make a
distinction.
2. Selective denials of liberty. Some restrictions on liberty apply to all or most -as in, for example, a general increase in security procedures at airports, or a measure that
subjects everyone, citizens and noncitizens alike, to special scrutiny when they are
dealing with substances that might be used in bioterrorism. Other restrictions on liberty
apply to some or few—as in, for example, restrictions on Japanese-Americans during
World War II, racial profiling, or the confinement of enemy aliens at Guantanamo Bay.120
When restrictions apply to all or most, it is reasonable to think that political safeguards
provide a strong check on unjustified government action. If the burden of the restriction
is widely shared, it is unlikely to be acceptable unless most people are convinced that
there is good reason for it; and for genuinely burdensome restrictions, people will not be
easily convinced unless a good reason is apparent or provided. But if the restriction is
imposed on an identifiable subgroup, the political check is weakened. Liberty-reducing
intrusions can be imposed even if they are difficult to justify. These are the circumstances
in which political checks are unlikely to provide an adequate safeguard against
unjustified presidential intrusions on liberty.121
These claims can be illuminated by a glance at the views of Frederick Hayek
about the rule of law. Hayek writes, “how comparatively innocuous, even if irksome, are
most such restrictions imposed on literally everybody, as . . . compared with those that
are likely to be imposed only on some!” 122 Thus it is “significant that most restrictions on
what we regard as private affairs, such as sumptuary legislation, have usually been
imposed only on selected groups of people or, as in the case of prohibition, were
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practicable only because the government reserved the right to grant exceptions.”123 Hayek
urges, in short, that the risk of unjustified burdens dramatically increases if they are
selective and if most people have nothing to worry about. The claim is especially
noteworthy in situations in which the executive is imposing restrictions on civil liberties.
People are likely to ask, with some seriousness, whether those restrictions are in fact
justified if the result is burdensome consequence on them. But if other people face the
relevant burdens, then the mere fact of “risk,” and the mere presence of fear, will seem to
provide a justification.
The danger of unjustified infringement is amplified when the victims of the
infringement can be seen as an identifiable group that is readily separable from “us.”
Stereotyping of groups significantly increases when people are in a state of fear; when
people are primed to think about their own death, they are more likely to think and act in
accordance with group-based stereotypes.124 Experimental findings of this kind support
the intuitive idea that when people are afraid, they are far more likely to tolerate
government action that abridges the freedom of members of some “out-group.” And if
this is the case, responses to social fear, in the form of infringements on liberties, will not
receive the natural political checks that arise when majorities suffer as well as benefit
from them. The simple idea here is that liberty-infringing action is most likely to be
justified if those who support that action are also burdened by it; in that event, the
political process contains a built-in protection against unjustifiable restrictions. In all
cases, it follows that free societies need some methods for ensuring against excessive
reactions to unjustified intrusions on civil liberties.
Consider in this regard an argument in a famous opinion by Justice Robert
Jackson.125 In that opinion, Justice Jackson made two points. The first is that when the
Court rules that some conduct cannot be regulated at all, it is intervening, in a major way,
into democratic processes, making that conduct essentially “unregulable.” The second is
that when the Court invalidates government action on equality grounds, it requires the
government to increase the breadth of its restriction, thus triggering political checks
123

Id.
See William von Hippel et al., Attitudinal Process Versus Context: The Role of Information Processing
Biases in Social Judgment and Behavior, in Joseph P. Forgas et al., eds Social Judgments 251, 263
(Cambridge 2003).
125
Railway Express Agency v New York, 336 US 106, 112-13 (1949).
124

26

against unjustified burdens. With a modest twist on Jackson’s argument, we can see a
potential approach for courts faced with claims about unlawful interference with civil
liberties. If the executive is imposing a burden on an identifiable subclass of people, a
warning flag should go up. The courts should give careful scrutiny to that burden.
Of course these general propositions do not resolve concrete cases; everything
turns on the particular nature of the legal challenge. In addition, the incidence of benefits
and burdens might result, in theory, in too much liberty rather than too much security.
Assume, for example, that government is asked to take steps that would provide security
to an identifiable subgroup rather than to the public as a whole, whereas the burden of
this step would be faced by everyone; if so, we should expect it to err in the direction of
insufficient protection of security, precisely for the reasons that Jackson emphasizes.126
The existence of selective benefits and burdens does not always show that the executive
will unduly sacrifice liberty; the opposite may be true.127 But an appreciation of the risks
of selectivity suggests the problems with National Security Maximalism. Political
processes are unlikely to provide an adequate check when government imposes burdens
on people who are unable to protect themselves in the political process. The legislature
has some advantages over the executive on this count, simply because it is both diverse
and deliberative, in a way that ought to ensure a degree of representation for identifiable
groups that are at risk.
To summarize: National Security Maximalism cannot claim much support in the
Constitution itself; on the contrary, the document does not give the President “the war
power.” The strongest claim for a maximalist approach emphasizes the Commander in
Chief Clause, which does give the President some “inherent” power; but that power must
be read in the light of a host of other provisions conferring broad authority on Congress.
In addition, National Security Maximalism reposes excessive confidence in the President.
Deliberative processes within a unitary branch are likely to lead to an amplification of
preexisting tendencies, not toward a system of internal checks and balances. When
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deprivations of liberty are limited to an identifiable few—as they frequently are—
external checks on the executive provide an insufficient safeguard of civil liberties. But
Liberty Maximalism is neither feasible nor desirable. Is there anything that courts might
do to help? And what does American history say about that question?
IV.

The Minimalist Alternative

“Even more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their successors is
the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of law.”128

As an alternative to National Security Maximalism, we might imagine a
minimalist approach. But what, precisely, is minimalism? It is easy to imagine a range of
answers, simply because minimalism is relative, not absolute. Suppose that a court
requires congressional authorization for presidential detentions of American citizens on
American soil. That ruling is more minimalist than a decision to require congressional
authorization for any and all presidential detentions; but it is less minimalist than a ruling
that in the particular circumstances of a given case, the President must obtain
congressional authorization to detain a particular American citizen on American soil.
With respect to minimalism, there is a continuum rather than a set of dichotomies.129
•

Belonging at the minimalist extreme is a refusal to hear a case at all, as in a denial of
certiorari or a jurisdictional ruling. Refusals to adjudicate offer no guidance at all.
They leave everything undecided.

•

Slightly less minimalist is an authoritative ruling, and therefore a holding, but one
that is unaccompanied by much in the way of reasoning -- as in, for example, a
judgment without opinion or a ruling whose rationale is so thin and vague that it fail
to give a real account of why the court ruled as it did.

•

Less minimalist, but firmly within the minimalist camp, is a narrow and shallow
decision, tightly tied to the facts of the particular case and avoiding broad statements
about the relevant law.

•

Still less minimalist, but minimalist still, is a set of established doctrines that embody
a self-conscious refusal to rule ambitiously. Consider, for example, the avoidance
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canon -- the notion that statutes should be construed so as to avoid constitutional
doubts.130 This idea is less minimalist than an insistent (stubborn? infuriating?)
refusal to specify the circumstances under which statutes will and should be so
construed. In its way, the avoidance canon is wide and therefore ambitious. In fact the
avoidance canon could well be justified deeply rather than shallowly—by
emphasizing, for example, the value of congressional rather than merely executive
deliberation on constitutionally sensitive issues.131 Nonetheless, the avoidance canon
is easily taken as part of the minimalist project. The reason is that it leaves the most
fundamental issues undecided; it refuses to take a stand on the contested issues of
constitutional law.
In the context of war, minimalists want above all to avoid large-scale
interventions into democratic processes. They do so because they know how little they
know, and because they generally respect the wishes of a threatened nation, at least when
Congress and the executive branch agree. Of course sensible people acknowledge that
courts should strike down egregious violations of constitutional rights. But outside of the
egregious cases, courts should proceed cautiously and narrowly when national security is
at risk. As I understand it here, the minimalist project is built on three principles in the
context of war. First, Congress should be required to authorize any interference with
constitutionally protected interests; as a general rule, the executive should not be allowed
to proceed on its own. Second, any deprivation of liberty, at the individual level, should
be accompanied by at least minimally fair procedures. Third, judicial decisions should be
narrow and incompletely theorized. As we shall see, these three principles, the
cornerstones of minimalism at war, do a remarkably good job of explaining the practices
of the Supreme Court amidst war. The first principle is the most complex, and it provides
the place to begin.132
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A. Clear Statement Principles
1. The basic framework. For many years, Israel’s General Security Service has
engaged in certain forms of physical coercion, sometimes described as torture, against
suspected terrorists. According to the General Security Service, these practices occurred
only in extreme cases and as a last resort, when deemed necessary to prevent terrorist
activity and significant loss of life. Nonetheless, practices worthy of the name “torture”
did occur, and they were not rare. Those practices were challenged before the Supreme
Court of Israel on the ground that they were inconsistent with the nation’s fundamental
law. The government responded that abstractions about human rights should not be
permitted to overcome real-world necessities so as to ban a practice that was, in certain
circumstances, essential to prevent massive deaths in an area of the world that was often
subject to terrorist activity. According to the government, physical coercion was justified
in these circumstances. A judicial decision to the opposite effect would be a form of
unjustified activism, even hubris.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court of Israel refused to resolve the most
fundamental questions.133 It declined to say whether the practices of the security forces
would be illegitimate if expressly authorized by a democratic legislature. But the Court
nonetheless held those practices unlawful. The Court’s principal argument was that if
such coercion were to be acceptable, it could not be because the General Security
Service, with its narrow agenda, said so. At a minimum, the disputed practices must be
endorsed by the national legislature, after a full democratic debate on the precise
question. “[T]his is an issue that must be decided by the legislative branch which
represents the people. We do not take any stand on this matter at this time. It is there that
various considerations must be weighed.”134
It is worthwhile to pause over the central feature of this decision. The Supreme
Court of Israel required clear legislative authorization for this particular intrusion on
liberty; it insisted that presidential action, under a vague or ambiguous law, would not be
enough. The Court’s decision stands for the general principle that even when national
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security is threatened, the legislative branch of government must explicitly authorize
disputed infringements on civil liberty. The reason for this safeguard is to ensure against
inadequately considered restrictions—and to insist that political safeguards, in the form
of agreement from a diverse and deliberative branch of government, are a minimal
precondition for intrusions on civil liberties. In these ways, the requirement of clear
legislative statement enlists the idea of checks and balances in the service of individual
rights—not through flat bans on government action, but through requiring two, rather
than one, branches of government to approve.
The Office of Legal Counsel memorandum, sketched above, provides a startling
and ironic contrast here. While the Supreme Court of Israel held that clear legislative
authorization is required to permit torture, the United States Department of Justice
concluded that clear legislative prohibition is insufficient to forbid torture. But it is
reasonable to doubt whether the Supreme Court of the United States would accept this
reasoning. The reason is that in a large number of cases, many involving national
security, the Court has required a clear congressional statement before permitting the
executive to intrude on an interest that has a plausible claim to constitutional protection.
These decisions can be understood to create “nondelegation canons”—canons of
construction ensuring that Congress and the President jointly, rather than the President
alone, will make decisions on constitutionally sensitive issues.135 In the context of threats
to national security, nondelegation canons provide a cornerstone of the practice of
minimalism at war.
As a leading example, consider Kent v Dulles,136 decided in the midst of the Cold
War. In that case, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, denied a passport to
Rockwell Kent, a member of the Communist Party, who sought to attend a meeting of the
“World Council of Peace” in Helsinki, Finland. The State Department denied the passport
on two grounds, both supported by its own regulations. First, Kent was a Communist;
second, Kent had “a consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line.”
Under the governing statute, enacted in 1926, the Secretary of State was authorized “to
grant and issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and
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prescribe for, and on behalf of, the United States . . . .”137 Kent objected that the denial of
the passport was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court could have decided the case on any number of grounds. It
could have said that Kent’s first amendment rights had been violated—that it was
unconstitutional to deny someone a passport because of his political convictions. It could
have said that the decision of the Secretary of State violated Kent’s right to travel—that
the due process clause includes a right to leave the country and that the government needs
particularly strong grounds for interfering with that right. It could have said that the grant
of open-ended discretion to the Secretary of State violated the nondelegation doctrine—
that under Article I, § 1, Congress must give the Secretary some guidelines by which to
decide whether to grant or to deny passports. Or it could have said that the denial of the
passport was lawful—authorized by the language of the relevant statute and, as
authorized, within constitutional bounds. All of these routes would have been simple and
straightforward.
The Court did none of these things. Instead it held that the denial of the passport
was beyond the statutory authority of the Secretary of State. Its analysis began with a
bow in the direction of constitutional requirements. In the Court’s view, the “right to
travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment.”138 The question of statutory authority would
be approached in this light. And while the statute was phrased in broad terms, the
Secretary had “long exercised” his power “quite narrowly.”139 In fact passports had been
refused in only two categories of cases: those in which the applicant’s citizenship and
allegiance to the United States were in doubt; and those in which the applicant was
engaged in unlawful conduct. No one claimed that Kent fell in either of these categories.
“We, therefore, hesitate to impute to Congress, when in 1952 it made a passport
necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of the Secretary of State,
a purpose to give him unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen
for any substantive reason he may choose.”140 The Court was concerned that Congress
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had particularly authorized the executive branch to do as it did. “No such showing of
extremity, no such showing of joint action by the Chief Executive and the Congress to
curtail a constitutional right of the citizen has been made here.”141
The Court left no doubt that its decision was constitutionally inspired. It drew
attention to the fact that the case involved “an exercise by an American citizen of an
activity included in constitutional protection.”142 For that reason, the Court would “not
readily infer that Congress gave the Secretary of State unbridled discretion.”143 The right
of exit had constitutional foundations, and if it is “to be regulated, it must be pursuant to
the law-making functions of the Congress.”144 Hence the Court would “construe narrowly
all delegated powers that curtail or dilute” those “activities and enjoyment, natural and
often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen.”145 The Court explicitly linked
its narrow construction with the nondelegation principle, citing cases that requires any
delegation to be accompanied by intelligible standards.146. The Court emphasized that it
“would be faced with important constitutional questions” if Congress “had given the
Secretary authority to withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or
associations.”147 But “Congress has made no such provision in explicit terms.”148
Proceeding in minimalist fashion, the Court left undecided the question whether Congress
could constitutionally give that authority to the President. The advantage of the
minimalist approach is that it reflects commendable uncertainty about difficult questions,
enlisting political safeguards as the first line of defense against unjustified intrusions on
freedom.
Was Kent v Dulles decided during war? In a sense, it was not; military forces
were not engaged in 1958, and the Court was aware of that fact. The Court explicitly
noted that “more restrictive measures were applied in 1918 and in 1941 as war
measures,” and it said that it would not “equate this present problem of statutory
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construction with problems that may arise under the war power.”149 But in 1958, the Cold
War was at its height, and in the period many people believed that the United States was,
in some sense, at war with the Soviet Union.150
Did Kent v Dulles involve the Commander in Chief Clause? That clause was not
directly mentioned. But the Court’s crucial citation, in Kent v Dulles, involved an explicit
reference to a case involving the Commander in Chief power: The Steel Seizure Case.151
In that case, the Court’s method was exceedingly close to that used in Kent v Dulles.
Hence The Steel Seizure Case is highly relevant to the question of presidential power
when national security is at risk. That much-discussed decision is illuminatingly seen in
minimalist terms.
In 1951,the President directed the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of,
and to operate, the majority of steels mills in the United States. The directive was
prompted by a threatened strike in the steel industry, one that would apparently
jeopardize the continued availability of steel. According to the President, national defense
was at risk, because steel was indispensable as a component in nearly all weapons and
war materials. The President defended his action as justified by his power as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. But the Supreme Court firmly rejected the
argument. It emphasized that there “is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to
take possession of the property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which
our attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be implied.”152 It
stressed that lawmaking power is vested in Congress, not in the President: “The Founders
of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad
times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the
hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice.”153 Justice Frankfurter wrote separately,
also emphasizing the need for both minimalism and checks and balances.154 But Justice
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Frankfurter’s opinion, and that of the Court itself, have come to be less important than the
concurring opinion of Justice Jackson, who explored in some detail the central
importance of a grant of authority from Congress.155
Jackson famously offered a tripartite division of presidential authority, suggesting
that the President’s “authority is at its maximum”156 when he is acting under an
authorization from Congress, and “at its lowest ebb” when the President’s exercise of
power is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”157 Less
famously but also significantly, Jackson offered a narrow construction of the Commander
in Chief clause, and showed a great deal of skepticism about the idea of “inherent”
presidential power. The Commander in Chief clause, he said, “undoubtedly puts the
Nation’s armed forces under presidential command.”158 But it could not be taken “as
support for any presidential action, internal or external, involving use of force . . . .”159
More broadly, Justice Jackson said that “no doctrine that the Court could promulgate
would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of
foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is so unknown, can vastly
enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own commitment of the
Nation’s armed forces to some foreign venture.”160 Jackson challenged the “loose and
irresponsible use of adjectives” that affected “much legal discussion of presidential
powers,” including adjectives like inherent, implied, incidental, war, plenary, and
emergency.161 Jackson expressed skepticism about these adjectives, suggesting that they
amounted to an effort to “amend” the work of those who produced the Constitution.
2. Illustrations. Jackson’s legislature-centered framework helps to organize a
remarkable number of Supreme Court decisions involving civil liberty and war, many of
them written before The Steel Seizure Case. Time and again, the Court has emphasized
the importance of congressional authorization for presidential action and refused to rule
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that the President has the power to act on his own. In these ways, the Court has acted in
good minimalist fashion, leaving many of the most fundamental questions undecided.162
Consider, for example, Ex Parte Endo,163 in which the Court struck down the
detention of concededly loyal Japanese-Americans on the West Coast. The case involved
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, sought on behalf of Mitsue Endo, a loyal citizen
who had been placed in a relocation center. The Court held that Endo would have to be
released. In so holding, it relied on the absence of statutory authorization for her
detention. “In reaching that conclusion we do not come to the underlying constitutional
issues which have been argued. For we conclude that, whatever power the War
Relocation Authority may have to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to
subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure.”164 The Court
emphasized that even in the midst of war, the President would have to identify clear
statutory authorization for any such detention: “In interpreting a wartime measure we
must assume that their purpose was to allow for the greatest possible accommodation
between those liberties and the exigencies of war.”165 Thus the constitutional issues
would be avoided in light of “the silence of the legislative history and of the Act and the
Executive Orders on the power to detain.”166 The Court added that “if there is to be the
greatest possible accommodation of the liberties of the citizen with this war measure, any
such implied power [of the President] must be narrowly confined to the precise purpose
of the evacuation program.”167
To be sure, the Court had also held, on the same day, that the forced evacuation of
Japanese-Americans was acceptable as a matter of statutory and constitutional law—a
holding to which I will turn in due course.168 But as in Kent v Dulles, the Court
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emphasized that for the evacuation, “the Congress and the Chief Executive moved in
coordinated action”169—a clear signal that the existence of simultaneous and explicit
approval by both branches was both necessary and sufficient to produce judicial
deference. The clarity of the signal is underlined by a pointed reference to Endo in Kent v
Dulles itself, citing Endo to support the proposition that narrow construction of delegated
powers is appropriate when “activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the
well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved.”170
In the same spirit is Duncan v Kahanamoku,171 involving the imposition of
martial law in Hawaii during World War II. Civilians in Hawaii had been imprisoned
after a trial in military tribunals; the central question was whether those tribunals had the
legal authority to try civilians. In its narrow ruling, the Court held that they did not. The
Court concluded that the Hawaii Organic Act did allow the governor of the state to
declare martial law, but it refused to agree that as a statutory matter, the governor of the
state, even with presidential approval, could “close all the courts and supplant them with
military tribunals.”172 The Court acknowledged that the statutory language and history
were unclear and stressed, as relevant to the interpretive question, “the birth,
development, and growth of our political institutions.”173 Because “courts and their
procedural safeguards are indispensable to our system of government,” the Court would
not construe an ambiguous statute to authorize the displacement, by the executive, of
ordinary courts with military tribunals.174
The oldest example of a minimalist approach to civil liberties can be found during
the Civil War period. President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, referring to
§ 9, clause 2 of the Constitution, which says, “The Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.”175 The Suspension Clause is phrased in the passive voice; it does not say
who may suspend the great writ. Chief Justice Roger Taney ruled that the President could
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not suspend the writ on his own; he needed congressional authorization.176 Chief Justice
Taney was able to point to the fact that the Suspension Clause is found in Article I, which
specifies the powers of Congress, rather than Article II, which deals with presidential
authority. The textual argument is certainly powerful, but Chief Justice Taney’s
conclusion is also supported by a structural concern, to the effect that suspension of
habeas corpus is a grave act, one that requires a judgment by a body that is both
deliberative and diverse.
In fact a clear statement principle, rather than the Constitution by itself, underlies
one of the most celebrated free speech decisions in American history: Judge Learned
Hand’s in the Masses case.177 At issue was an effort by the postmaster of New York to
prevent the mailing of a revolutionary journal called The Masses. The postmaster
invoked the Espionage Act of 1917. Judge Hand’s opinion, decided during World War I,
was animated by free speech principles, but he rested his decision on narrow reading of
the Act rather than on the First Amendment. Judge Hand contended under the Act, speech
would be protected unless it expressly advocated lawless action; it could not be regulated
merely because it did so indirectly or by implication.
This interpretation of the Act was hardly inevitable. By its terms, the Act banned
any effort willfully “to cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or
refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States”; it also banned any
effort willfully to “obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.”178
These prohibitions could well have been understood to apply to the relevant issue of The
Masses, which praised and even glorified conscientious objectors to the draft.179 Judge
Hand strained to argue that “One may admire and approve the course of a hero without
feeling any duty to follow him. There is not the least implied intimation in these words
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that others are under a duty to follow.”180 Judge Hand’s narrow construction of the Act
enabled him to avoid resolution of a difficult constitutional problem.
Judge Hand’s approach was followed in some of the most famous libertypromoting dissenting opinions written in World War I, by Justices Louis Brandeis and
Oliver Wendell Holmes.181 Both Brandeis and Holmes are now celebrated for their
insistence on the constitutional protection of free speech. But their opinions have
unmistakable minimalist features, arguing for narrow construction of authorization to the
executive, not for invalidation on constitutional grounds. In one case, the Postmaster
General revoked the mailing privileges of a newspaper because it published articles that
criticized America’s involvement in World War I and that therefore might be taken to
obstruct military recruitment and enlistment. Refusing to interpret the Espionage Act in
this way, both Brandeis and Holmes contended that the statute should not be read to grant
such open-ended power to the President.182 Justice Brandeis insisted that the real question
“is one of statutory construction.”183 The Postmaster General had argued that the relevant
articles violated the Espionage Act, but the statute need not be taken in that way.184 In a
manner analogous to that pursued by the majority in Kent v Dulles, Justice Brandeis
sketched the historical practices of Congress and the executive to suggest that the
Postmaster General lacked the statutory authority to exclude materials that he deemed
objectionable and even unlawful.185 And Justice Brandeis explicitly invoked a clear
statement principle on behalf of his narrow construction, suggesting that “even if the
statutes were less clear in this respect than they seem, I should be led to adopt that
construction because of the familiar rule” that legislative enactments should be read so as
to avoid constitutional doubts.186
Justice Holmes spoke in identical terms, insisting that “it would take very strong
language to convince me that Congress ever intended to give such a practically despotic
power to any one man. . . . Therefore I do not consider the limits of its constitutional
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power.”187 Justice Holmes’ great dissenting opinion in Abrams did speak of the first
amendment.188 But his initial submission was that the governing statutes should be
interpreted not to cover the speech that had been subject to prosecution.189 Of course
nothing here is meant to deny the fact that Brandeis and Holmes sometimes voted simply
to strike legislation down on constitutional grounds. All I am emphasizing here is that in
some striking opinions, they took a more minimalist approach to intrusions on free
speech amidst war.
In fact, an approach of this sort attracted the support of a majority of the Court at
the height of the Cold War. Following Judge Hand and Justice Brandeis, the Court
protected speech through an aggressive clear statement approach in Yates v United
States.190 At issue was a provision of the Smith Act, making it unlawful to “advocate,
abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or
destroying any government in the United States by force or violence”; to print, sell, edit,
display, or circulate written matters so advocating; and “to organize or to help to organize
any group or assembly of persons who reach, advocate, or encourage overthrowing or
destroying any government in the United States by force or violence.”191 The Court
narrowly construed these terms, concluding that the Act does not prohibit “advocacy and
teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle,” and that it reaches only efforts
“to instigate action to that end.”192 The Court referred to the constitutional difficulty but
insisted: “We need not, however, decide the issue before us in terms of constitutional
compulsion, for our first duty is to construe this statute. In doing so, we should not
assume that Congress chose to disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly
marked.”193

187

Id at 437.
Abrams, 250 US at 632 (1919) (Holmes dissenting).
189
Id at 626-27. It would be easy to imagine a slight recasting of Holmes’ opinion in Abrams that would
speak principally in statutory terms, emphasizing the constitutional backdrop as he did in Burleson.
Notably, however, his Abrams opinion begins with the statute, but adds, “let me pass to the more important
aspect of the case. I refer to the First Amendment of the Constitution that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech.” Id at 627. Holmes thus shows some (nonminimalist) impatience with the
statutory issues, in a way that suggests an intense desire to clarify the constitutional problem.
190
354 US 298 (1957).
191
Smith Act, June 28, 1940, 54 Stat 670, 671. See 354 US at 300-01.
192
Id at 318.
193
Id at 319.
188

40

The Court also offered a narrow construction of the term “organize,” which it
limited to acts entering into the initial creation of an organization, not to acts performed
in carrying on its activities.194 The Court thus refused to permit the executive to interpret
the Smith Act to enter into a “constitutional danger zone,” even though the language
could easily have been taken to allow it to do so. What was required was clear
congressional authorization.195
An analogous lesson emerges from the much-discussed decision in Ex Parte
Quirin,196 where the Court upheld the use of military commissions to try German
saboteurs captured during World War II. In that case, the President asked the Court to
hold that as Commander in Chief, the President had inherent authority to create and to
use military tribunals. The Court refused to accept this argument: “It is unnecessary for
present purposes to determine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has
constitutional power to create military commissions without the support of Congressional
legislation. For here Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war
before such commissions.”197 Thus the Court posed the question as involving the unified
position of Congress and the executive: “We are concerned only with the question
whether it is within the constitutional power of the National Government to place
petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses with which they are
charged.”198 The congressional grant of authority was far from unambiguous here, and
hence the Court’s interpretation might have been motivated, in part, by a desire to avoid
ruling on the President’s broad claims about his authority as Commander in Chief.199 The
crucial point is that the Court’s reliance on congressional authorization gives Quirin an
unmistakable minimalist character.
In its ruling, the Quirin Court followed the path set out by the concurring justices
in Ex Parte Milligan, which prohibited the use of military tribunals to try civilians during
the Civil War.200 Rejecting a broad constitutional ruling from the majority,201 the
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concurring justices said, “It is for Congress to determine the question of expediency. And
Congress did determine it. That body did not see fit to authorize trials by military
commission in Indiana, but by the strongest implication prohibited it . . .”202 Avoiding the
constitutional question, the concurring justices emphasized that the President had not
been authorized to use military tribunals. So too in the Hamdi case, to which I will turn in
due course; there the Court refused to consider the President’s broad claim of inherent
authority to detain citizens who count as “enemy combatants.” It chose instead the
minimalist route of emphasizing the existence of congressional authorization for such
detentions.203
3. Korematsu and Hirabayashi redux: minimalism in surprising places. This
catalogue should be sufficient to show that a primary precept of minimalism in war,
requiring congressional authorization for intrusions on liberty, helps to organize a
remarkable variety of judicial decisions. But I have not discussed the Supreme Court’s
most notorious decisions in this domain: Hirabayashi v United States204 and Korematsu v
United States.205 In Hirabayashi, the Court upheld a curfew order imposed by a military
commander on an American citizen of Japanese ancestry. In Korematsu, the Court upheld
a military order excluding an American citizen of Japanese descent from San Leandro,
California. It is tempting and probably even right to see both decisions as cowardly and
deplorable capitulations, on the part of the Court, to intrusions on liberty that could find
no justification in national security concerns.206 It is even tempting to see both decisions
as vindications of National Security Maximalism. But the Court’s overall approach also
has an unmistakable minimalist feature, requiring executive action to be authorized by
Congress, and deferring to it only if it has been so authorized.
Hirabayashi was largely decided on institutional grounds. The Court’s initial
submission was that “so far as it lawfully could, Congress authorized and implemented
such curfew orders as the commanding officer should promulgate pursuant to the
201
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Executive Order of the President.”207 Thus dual branch lawmaking, rather than executive
unilateralism,208 was involved: “The question then is . . . whether, acting in cooperation,
Congress and the President have constitutional authority to impose the curfew restriction
here complained of.”209 The Court ultimately concluded that “it was within the
constitutional power of Congress and the executive arm of the Government to prescribe
this curfew order for the period under consideration.”210 In fact one of Hirabayashi’s
principal objections was that the curfew had been an unconstitutional delegation by
Congress; the Court’s response was that the statute was to be read together with the
executive’s actions under it, so that “the standard set up for the guidance of the military
commander, and the action taken and the reasons for it, are in fact recorded in the
military orders.”211
Of course the Court could have ruled otherwise, and I am not suggesting that it
was right to do as it did. The Court could have concluded that the orders were
unacceptable unless Congress had specifically set out the governing standards through
ordinary law. A nondelegation challenge was hardly implausible; and the Court would
have done better, in my view, to have proceeded as in Kent v Dulles, so as to find an
absence of sufficient legislative authorization for an extraordinary intrusion into the
domain of liberty. The general tenor of the Court’s opinion might reasonably be invoked
in support of National Security Maximalism: “Since the Constitution commits to the
Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and
conditions of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of
judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or
danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it. . . . [I]t is not for any court to sit
in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.”212 Note,
however, that even here, the Court stressed that both Congress and the executive had
concurred; the executive was not acting on its own.
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In Korematsu, the Court similarly emphasized that the exclusion order was based
on a recent statute, making it a crime to “remain in . . . any military area of military zone”
so prescribed by a competent official.213 The exclusion order, issued by General Dewitt,
was specifically authorized by an Executive Order by the President, who was in turn
acting under congressional authorization. The Court stressed the institutional force
behind the exclusion: “The Hirabayashi conviction and this one thus rest on the same
1942 Congressional Act and the same basic executive and military orders.”214 The Court
pointedly noted that it was dealing not with the executive alone, but with “the war power
of Congress and the Executive.”215
Justice Frankfurter underlined the institutional point: “I find nothing in the
Constitution which denies to Congress the power to enforce such a valid military order by
making its violation an offense triable in the civil courts.”216 Justice Jackson, dissenting,
also emphasized institutional factors, but saw them as cutting the other way: “[T]he ‘law’
of which this prisoner is convicted of disregarding is not found in an act of Congress, but
in a military order. Neither the Act of Congress nor the Executive Order of the President,
nor both together, would afford a basis for this conviction. It rests on the orders of
General Dewitt.”217 This institutional point plainly contributed to Justice Jackson’s
refusal to vote to uphold the evacuation.
But let us take the Court’s three decisions as a whole. If we consider Hirabayashi
and Korematsu together with Ex Parte Endo, we can obtain a fresh perspective on what
the Court was doing with the American government’s acts of discrimination against
Japanese-Americans. In short, it was rejecting National Security Maximalism and Liberty
Maximalism in favor of a distinctive form of minimalism. In none of the three cases did
the Court issue a broad ruling on presidential authority. When the executive acted without
congressional authorization, it lost; it survived legal attack only when Congress had
specifically permitted its action. In all three cases, the Court paid exceedingly careful
attention to the role of legislation, and thus refused to rule that the Commander in Chief
power allowed the President to act on his own. In permitting the executive to implement a
213
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curfew and an exclusion order, the Court rejected Liberty Maximalism, indicating that it
would yield to the shared judgments of the two democratically accountable branches.
Of course it would be possible to question the Court’s holdings. In my view, the
Court should have required greater legislative clarity in Hirabayashi. I have said that the
Court should have ruled, in the fashion of Kent v Dulles, that if Japanese-Americans were
going to be deprived of their liberty, it must be as a result of clear and specific
instructions from the national legislature.218 And in Korematsu, Justice Jackson’s opinion
could have been recast to emphasize the absence of clear authorization from either
Congress or the President. But for present purposes, the most important point lies
elsewhere. Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo reflect an emphatically minimalist
approach to civil liberties in wartime—an approach that both defers to, and insists on,
agreement from both of the democratically accountable branches.
From the standpoint of liberty, of course, skeptics will object that deference is
unacceptable even if both branches agree. All I am suggesting here is that congressional
authorization should ordinarily be required for presidential intrusion into the domain of
constitutionally sensitive interests -- and that outside of the egregious cases, courts will,
and usually should, hesitate if such authorization is forthcoming.
4. Clear statements and terrorism. In the recent cases involving terrorism, clear
statement principles have played a central role.
a. Hamdi. Such principles were endorsed most explicitly by Justice Souter, in his
concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, in Hamdi.219 Justice Souter’s central
argument was that Congress had not authorized Hamdi’s detention when a clear
statement from Congress was required:
“In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable
degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is
not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular
responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the
branch of Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest
the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in
218
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liberty on the way to victory. . . . a reasonable balance is more likely to be reached on the
judgment of a different branch.” 220
In making this argument, Justice Souter invoked the Non-Detention Act, which
plainly states, “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States
except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”221 In his view, the Non-Detention Act ought
generally to be read in accordance with its apparently “severe” terms.222 One reason is
that the Act was enacted against the background “of an interpretive regime that subjected
enactments limiting liberty in wartime to the requirement of a clear statement and
[Congress] presumably intended” the Act “to be read accordingly.”223 Emphasizing the
cautionary examples afforded by history, and proceeding in light of the executive’s
incentive to favor security over liberty, Justice Souter contended that “manifest authority
to detain” should be demanded “before detention is authorized.”224
Hence Justice Souter emphasized “the need for a clearly expressed congressional
resolution of the competing claims.”225 Not having found any such resolution, he
concluded that the detention was unlawful. In a fashion reminiscent of Justice Jackson in
The Steel Seizure Case, Justice Souter went on “to note the weakness of the
Government’s claim of inherent, executive authority” to detain people.226 He
acknowledged the possibility that the President could do this “in a moment of genuine
emergency, when the Government must act with no time for deliberation.”227 But that
was not the case here.
I believe that Justice Souter was entirely correct to stress the importance of
requiring a clear statement from Congress before authorizing detentions of this sort by
the executive. But for two different reasons, I am not sure that Justice Souter was correct
in his conclusion in Hamdi. First, and most fundamentally, a congressional authorization
to use force is reasonably read to include the authority to detain those combatants who
were captured during hostilities, at least for the period of those hostilities—a point to
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which I will return. Second, the President claimed inherent authority to detain those
captured on the battlefield—a claim that was at least plausible under the Commander in
Chief clause. For this reason, the plurality’s conclusion—that Congress had authorized
the detention—actually helped to avoid the resolution of a serious constitutional question.
This latter point raises some real complexities for minimalism and the use of clear
statement principles to limit presidential power. Such principles are justified, as in Kent v
Dulles, as a means of avoiding constitutional questions by requiring a judgment by two
branches, rather than simply one, that an invasion of liberty is justified. But in some
(narrow) contexts, the President will be able to make a plausible argument that he has
inherent authority to proceed with some course of action. If so, there is reason for an
opposing clear statement principle, one that reads ambiguous statutory provisions as
authorizing, rather than forbidding, presidential action. In fact this is an important form of
judicial minimalism, and it is one reading of the Court’s opinion in Ex Parte Quirin.228
When the President has a strong claim of inherent power, the clear statement approach
does not argue in favor of limiting his authority. But for the reasons sketched by Justice
Jackson, broad claims of inherent power, made by reference to the Commander in Chief
Clause, are usually not strong. On the contrary, they are usually implausible. When they
are strong, the Hamdi plurality’s approach is the right form of minimalism. When they
lack plausibility, Justice Souter provides the best path for the future.
Indeed, an important aspect of the Hamdi plurality’s own approach reflects an
endorsement of Justice Souter’s central idea. The government had argued that as a result
of Congress’ authorization of the use of force, it was permitted to detain Hamdi
indefinitely.229 The plurality rejected this argument, invoking a kind of clear statement
principle, one that read the authorization to allow detention only during active
prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. The Court noted that “the national security
underpinnings of the ‘war on terror,’ although crucially important, are broad and
malleable.”230 A longstanding war on terror might mean that “Hamdi’s detention could
228
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last for the rest of his life.”231 Congress had said nothing to allow the President to reach
this conclusion. The Court insisted, in this light, that “indefinite detention for the purpose
of interrogation is not authorized.”232 It went on to conclude that detention could occur
only for the duration of the hostilities in Afghanistan.233 This conclusion, based on a
narrow reading of the authorization of the use of force, is a more modest version of
Justice Souter’s plea for a clear statement principle in Hamdi.
b. Padilla. Minimalism of the same sort played the central role in the powerful
decision of the court of appeals in the Padilla case.234 At issue was the legality of the
detention of Jose Padilla, an American citizen held as an enemy combatant after having
been seized on American soil. The court squarely rejected the claim, urged by the
executive and rooted in National Security Maximalism, to the effect that the “President
has the inherent authority to detain those who take up arms against this country.”235 The
court of appeals correctly emphasized that Articles I and II divide the war powers, rather
than conferring them on the executive alone.236 The courtt added that the grant of
numerous war-related powers “to Congress is a powerful indication that, absent express
congressional authorization, the President’s Commander in Chief powers do not support”
the confinement of an American citizen captured on American soil. It stressed that
Quirin, the government’s best precedent, rested on congressional authorization rather
than on inherent presidential authority.237
Thus the key issue was whether such authorization could be found here. In the
court’s view, Congress’ authorization to use “all necessary and appropriate force” to
respond to the September 11 attacks should be understood in light of Endo. There the
Court emphasized that “in interpreting a war-time measure we must assume that [the
purpose of Congress and the Executive] was to allow for the greatest possible
accommodation between those liberties and the exigencies of war.”238 Here no clear and
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unmistakable statement could be found; and that was what was required.239 This decision
is an unambiguous exercise in minimalism at war.
5. What kind of authorization? A general emphasis on the need for congressional
authorization hardly answers all questions about the relationship between statutory
provisions and presidential power.240 We can group the cases discussed thus far into three
categories. Sometimes Congress is required to authorize; the President cannot act without
some grant of power from the national legislature. Sometimes Congress is required to
authorize clearly; in the face of ambiguity, the President is not permitted to engage in a
certain course of conduct. Sometimes Congress is required to authorize both clearly and
specifically; without an express grant of authority to act in a specific way, the President is
powerless. My emphasis has been on the need for clear authorization, which dominates
the cases on liberty amidst war. But as the discussion thus far should suggest, the other
categories are relevant as well.
When the President has inherent authority to act, legislative authorization is by
hypothesis irrelevant. If, for example, prompt presidential warmaking is needed to repel a
sudden attack on the United States, the best reading of the Constitution is that the
President can take action whether or not Congress has authorized him to do so.241 But
suppose that the President merely has a plausible claim of inherent authority to act—and
that there is a reasonable dispute about whether that authority actually exists. In such
cases, the minimalist route is to require congressional authorization, and to find such
authorization both necessary and sufficient whether or not it is clear. Because a
constitutional question would be presented if such authorization were absent, minimalist
judges reasonably rule that the authorization need not be clear. Indeed, such judges might
aggressively construe the existing statutory materials to enable the President to do what
(he plausibly claims) the Constitution enables him to do on his own. Ex Parte Quirin,
finding authorization that cannot fairly be described as clear,242 is the most important
example of this kind of minimalism.
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But compare a case in which the President lacks a strong claim of constitutional
power and in which some kind of liberty-based objection is mounted against his action.
Here the proper course is to require a high degree of clarity. Hamdi, Kahanamoku,
Masses, and Yates comfortably fall in this category. And where the liberty-based
objection is especially strong, both clarity and specificity should be required. The
difference between the two is usually unimportant, because clarity is usually absent
without specificity. But we can see the relevance of the distinction in the disagreement
between the plurality and Justice Souter in Hamdi. Justice Souter would have required
specificity in the form of an express grant of authority to detain. By contrast, the plurality
was satisfied with the general authorization for the use of force, which seemed relatively
clear in light of historical understandings.243 I will return to this dispute shortly. Note in
this regard that Kent v Dulles is the strongest precedent for the view that congressional
authorization must be both clear and specific; and Ex Parte Endo speaks in similar terms.
The most sensible orienting point here is that the demand for specificity grows with the
magnitude of the intrusion on liberty—a claim that will shortly bring us to the second
component of minimalism at war.
6. On the necessity and sufficiency of congressional authorization. Under the law
as I have reconstructed it here, congressional authorization is ordinarily both a necessary
and a sufficient condition for presidential intrusions into the domain of constitutionally
sensitive interests. I have also noted that in some areas, such authorization is not
necessary. And many civil libertarians will argue that in many areas, such authorization is
not sufficient. They will fear that in times of genuine crisis, Congress is likely to do
whatever the President wants; and if the stakes are high enough, it will do so fairly
automatically, capitulating to his will. Isn’t it better, and in a sense more minimalist, to
say that while congressional authorization is often sufficient, it should not always be, and
that question must be resolved on a case-by-case basis rather than categorically?
A committed minimalist would be tempted to answer this question with an
enthusiastic “Yes.” In fact I have already suggested that congressional authorization is
sometimes insufficient. Even if Congress and the President agree to silence political
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dissent during war, the first amendment should stand in their way; and for reasons to be
discussed shortly, fair hearings should generally be required even if the democratic
branches want to dispense with them. But committed minimalists should also agree that
outside of the egregious cases, and when Congress and the President have settled on a
certain course of action, courts should be reluctant to rule against them. At the very least,
American history attests to the likelihood that courts will follow this path when the stakes
are high. Of course we can imagine clear constitutional violations, even outrages, in
which we might expect, and certainly hope for, a degree of judicial courage.244
Unfortunately, national experience testifies to the existence and future likelihood of such
violations. The jury remains out, so to speak, on the likelihood of future judicial courage.
What I am emphasizing here is that congressional authorization should be seen as the first
line of defense against intrusions into the domain of constitutionally sensitive interests.
B. Minimally Fair Procedures
In one of the wisest and most important pronouncements in the history of
American law, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote, “The history of liberty has largely been
the history of the observance of procedural safeguards.”245 A primary component of the
minimalist program is to take this pronouncement extremely seriously, by requiring,
where the legal materials are ambiguous, some kind of hearing for those who are
deprived of their liberty.
Indeed, many of the cases explored thus far are centrally concerned with
procedural safeguards. The clearest statement along these lines is found in Duncan v
Kahanamoku, the martial law case from Hawaii, in which the Court narrowly construed
the Hawaiian Organic Act so as to ensure that civilians would receive access to ordinary
courts.246 There the Court offered a ringing endorsement of “procedural safeguards,”
describing them as “indispensable to our system of government” and as ensuring checks
on executive absolutism.247 Ex Parte Endo is best read in this general spirit. So too, Chief
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Justice Taney’s rejection of President Lincoln’s claim of authority to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus endorses this aspect of minimalism at war.
The requirement of a hearing before people can lose their liberty deserves firm
judicial support even when national security is at risk. Of course a general proposition of
this kind does not resolve all cases; if people have been captured on the battlefield and
are held beyond the territorial jurisdiction of American courts, then judges are powerless
to intervene.248 But if the legal materials can fairly be interpreted to require procedural
protection, they should be so interpreted. And indeed this idea has received ringing
endorsement in recent Supreme Court decisions involving the war on terrorism. Of these
the more elaborately reasoned was the plurality opinion in Hamdi v Rumsfeld,249
mentioned above; it is now time to explore that ruling in more detail.
Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen born in Louisiana, was seized by
members of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. From there he was transferred to
Guantanamo Bay, then to a naval brig in Norfolk Virginia, and then to a brig in
Charleston, South Carolina. According to the United States government, Hamdi qualified
as an “enemy combatant” and hence could be held indefinitely without formal
proceedings of any kind. The government urged that Hamdi had become affiliated with a
Taliban military unit, received weapons training, and had an assault rifle with him at the
time that he surrendered to the Northern Alliance.
The initial question was whether the executive had been authorized to detain
citizens who qualify as “enemy combatants.” This was an unusually complex question,
for the government argued that even if Congress had not so authorized the executive, the
executive “possesses plenary power to detain pursuant to Article II of the
Constitution.”250 As I have noted, the plurality avoided the constitutional question by
holding that Congress had authorized presidential detentions. The plurality pointed to the
language of the authorization for the use of military force, which gives the President the
authority to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or
persons” associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The plurality
concluded that the detention of “enemy combatants,” at least for the duration of the
248
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conflict in which the capture occurred, “is so fundamental and accepted an incident to
war as to be” an authorized exercise of “necessary and appropriate force.”251
This was not an inevitable conclusion. As I have noted, Justice Souter contended
that an explicit legislative statement should be required and that no such statement could
be found. The plurality responded, plausibly, that detention to prevent return to the
battlefield “is a fundamental incident of war.” But we have also seen that the plurality
rejected the government’s claim that Congress had authorized indefinite detention by the
executive. In its view, the “detention may last no longer than active hostilities.”252 As a
matter of statutory interpretation, the plurality said that Congress’ grant of authority to
use force included the power to detain only for the duration of the relevant conflict. In
good minimalist fashion, the plurality acknowledged that this “understanding may
unravel” if “the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the
conflicts that informed the development of the law of war.”253 But this “is not the
situation we face as of this date.”254
Having found that the detention of Hamdi was authorized, at least for the duration
of the conflict, the plurality turned to the question of due process. The government
contended that because Hamdi was seized in a combat zone, no factfinding was
necessary. The plurality disagreed. For Hamdi to be lawfully detained, he would have to
have been part of armed forces engaged in conflict against the United States. This
question was disputed and the conclusion of the executive would not be enough. The
government also argued that no individual procedure was justified “in light of the
extraordinary constitutional interests at stake”—or at most, that the court should ask
whether “some evidence” supported the executive’s determination that a citizen is an
enemy combatant.255 The plurality disagreed here as well. In the key passage, the
plurality said that an enemy combatant must be supplied with “notice of the factual basis
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for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions
before a neutral decisionmaker.”256
The plurality acknowledged the possibility that the constitutional requirements
could be met before a military tribunal.257 What was necessary was not any particular set
of procedures, but a process that offers both notice and a chance to be heard. “We
anticipate that a District Court would proceed with the caution that we have indicated is
necessary in this setting, engaging in a factfinding process that is both prudent and
incremental.”258
What is noteworthy about the plurality’s reasoning is its insistence on the right to
a fair hearing before a deprivation of freedom, which is called one of the “essential
liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.”259 Minimalists
emphasize that right above all others. Of all the opinions in the Court’s terrorism cases,
the clearest endorsement of this point can be found in Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion
in Padilla, where he wrote that “[u]nconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of
investigating and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber,”
and added that the ability to retain “counsel for the purpose of protecting the citizen from
official mistakes and mistreatment is the hallmark of due process,” even when the nation
is attempting “to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.”260 In so saying, Justice
Stevens was writing in the same spirit as the Court’s majority, which has yet to question
the general requirement of fair hearings.261
Of course that requirement has exceptions. Good minimalists cannot claim that
hearings are always required; the very endorsement of hearing rights is, in its way, a
departure from the minimalist reluctance to rule widely. As the Court said in Rasul,
“there is a realm of political authority over military affairs where the judicial power may
not enter.”262 If an enemy combatant is being held for a specific period in an area outside
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the territorial control of the United States, federal courts may not intervene.263 It is clear
that as Commander in Chief, the President can authorize the capture and detention of
enemy combatants for specified periods of time, free from federal judicial oversight. But
even in such situations, American courts have been careful to reject indefinite detention
without trial, and have looked to ensure that some kind of procedure was available to
reduce the risk of error.264 In times of war, minimalist judges are reluctant to impose
sharp constraints on the executive. But they are less reluctant to intervene when they are
being asked to ensure against arbitrary or mistaken deprivations of liberty.
C. Narrow and Incompletely Theorized Rulings
Thus far my emphasis has been on the need to restrain executive power. But there
is also a need for courts to restrain themselves. In the context of war, minimalists endorse
narrow, incompletely theorized rulings in order to promote two goals. First, judges ought
to avoid excessive intrusions into the executive domain. Minimalist rulings help to ensure
against judicial overreaching. Second, judges ought to avoid setting precedents that will,
in retrospect, appear to give excessive authority to the President.265 Minimalist rulings
help to ensure against that risk as well.
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in The Steel Seizure Case offers the most
elaborate discussion of the basic point.266 He emphasized that “[r]igorous adherence to
the narrow scope of the judicial function” is especially important in constitutional cases
when national security is at risk, notwithstanding the national “eagerness to settle—
preferably forever—a specific problem on the basis of the broadest possible
constitutional pronouncement.”267 In his view, the Court’s duty “lies in the opposite
direction,” through judgments that make it unnecessary to consider “delicate problems of
power under the Constitution.”268 Thus the Court has an obligation “to avoid putting
fetters upon the future by needless pronouncements today.”269 Thus he would have ruled,
very narrowly, that the President had been deprived, by Congress, of the authority to
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engage in the seizure of the steel mills—a ruling that would have said exceedingly little
about the hardest constitutional questions.270
We have already encountered a number of illustrations of analogous forms of
judicial self-discipline. The ruling in Kent v Dulles left the largest constitutional
questions for another day. So too, the concurring justices in Ex Parte Milligan argued
against a broad ruling on individual rights. In the same vein, Ex Parte Quirin,
emphasizing congressional authorization, was a narrow ruling, simply because it left so
much in legislative hands. In Masses, Judge Hand did not hold that Congress lacked the
constitutional power to punish the relevant speech; he ruled more modestly that Congress
had not seen fit to exercise whatever power it might have. The Supreme Court followed
precisely the same approach in Yates.
The same tendency toward minimalist rulings was on fine display in 2004. In
Rasul v Bush,271 the Court was asked to say whether federal courts have jurisdiction to
consider the detentions of foreign nationals captured and incarcerated at Guantanamo
Bay. The Court chose to restrict itself to two exceedingly narrow questions. It held only
that the federal habeas statute granted jurisdiction to federal courts to hear challenges by
foreign nationals to their detentions, and that the Alien Tort Statute did not bar federal
jurisdiction.272 Having reached these conclusions, the Court said almost nothing else:
“Whether and what proceedings may become necessary after respondents make their
response to the merits of petitioners’ claims are matters that we need not address now.
What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to
determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of individuals
who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.”273
We might compare the majority’s approach here with the maximalist approaches
of Justices Scalia and Thomas. Characteristically, Justice Scalia produced two opinions
that were both deep and wide. In Hamdi, he argued that unless Congress has suspended
the writ of habeas corpus, an American citizen is entitled to challenge his imprisonment
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and to obtain release unless and until criminal proceedings are brought.274 The
implication here is large: The President of the United States may not detain American
citizens indefinitely, even if they are captured on the battlefield, unless the writ of habeas
corpus has been suspended. “Many think it not only inevitable but entirely proper that
liberty give way to security in times of national crisis . . . Whatever the general merits of
the view that war silences law or modulates its voice, that view has no place in the
interpretation and application of a Constitution designed precisely to confront war and, in
a manner that accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it.”275 Suspension of
habeas corpus, or an ordinary trial-type hearing, is the rule for American citizens.
Justice Scalia’s preference for a maximalist ruling fits well with one of his
strongest argument on behalf of wide rather than narrow decisions: Width works not only
to constrain judges but also to embolden them. “The chances that frail men and women
will stand up to their unpleasant duty are greatly increased if they can stand behind the
solid shield of a firm, clear principle enunciated in earlier cases.”276
Justice Scalia urges a different but similarly wide rule for foreign nationals
detained overseas by the United States military.277 Here his rule is also clear: The federal
habeas corpus statute does not apply at all, and the President can detain people free from
judicial oversight. Thus Justice Scalia rejects the Court’s conclusion that some kind of
hearing is necessary to support detention. “For this Court to create such a monstrous
scheme in time of war, and in frustration of our military commanders’ reliance upon
clearly stated prior law, is judicial adventurism of the worst sort.”278 Justice Thomas
joined Justice Scalia on the point; and as we have seen, he also favors a broad rule for
American citizens, permitting the President to detain enemy combatants indefinitely. For
present purposes, what is noteworthy about the Scalia and Thomas opinions is that they
favor both width and depth. Justice Thomas is quite explicit on this point, objecting
specifically to the Court’s use of a “balancing scheme” and responding, “I do not think
that the Federal Government’s war powers can be balanced away by this Court.”279
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Of course civil libertarians are likely to approve of Justice Scalia’s approach in
Hamdi and to reject that of Justices Scalia and Thomas in Rasul. But as Justice Thomas
points out, Justice Scalia’s liberty-protecting position in Hamdi creates risks simply
because of its breadth.280 If Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas were clearly right on the
law, then no one could object to their plea for depth and width. But suppose that the law
is not clear and that a deep or wide ruling might be confounded by unanticipated
circumstances. If so, there is every reason for federal judges to issue shallow and narrow
opinions, refusing to freeze the future and allowing decisions to turn on particular
circumstances. Indeed, the Court’s very refusal to decide the Padilla case on the merits,
relying instead on a jurisdictional objection, can be understood as an extreme example of
an insistence on shallowness and narrowness281; and if the underlying issues are
extremely complex, then it is not hard to understand the Court’s reluctance to resolve
them.282
At this point it would be possible to object that narrow decisions, stressing
particular facts, are in a sense more intrusive than those that offer greater width and
depth. The reason is that narrow decisions leave the executive, and other institutions, so
unclear about what they are supposed to do. This is a significant and legitimate concern
about Rasul in particular. I have emphasized that that decision is highly minimalist,
holding only that on these particular facts, these detainees are entitled to hearings. But
this ruling leaves the government with very little guidance. Are those held at an air force
base in Afghanistan or Iraq entitled to hearings? Does it matter if they are only being held
for a few weeks, while the government explores the relevant facts, obtains a translator,
and so forth? Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion appears responsive to the
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government’s need for a measure of clarity.283 If the Court leaves too much undecided,
the government will have to proceed in the dark, in a way that might lead to a range of
problems.
As evidence, consider here the distinctive problems that have emerged in the
aftermath of Rasul. In December 2004, a federal district court “served as the stage for the
beginning of what [was] expected to be a long and bruising second phase of the legal
battle” over the fate of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.284 The adnministration argued for a
narrow reading of Rasul, one that would be satisfied by a hearing at the naval base in
which detainees were permitted to argue that they were not properly characterized as
enemy combatants.285 By contrast, the detainees contended that they were entitled to a
lawyer and to an opportunity to see the evidence against them.286 Because the Supreme
Court did not resolve this dispute, protracted litigation was inevitable. In this light, it is
reasonable to worry whether narrowness might not create unnecessary and even
damaging uncertainty.
The concern is justified, and for some problems, it offers a good reason for a
degree of width; but that reason is only one of a set of relevant considerations, many of
them pointing toward narrow rulings in the context of war. If judges can be confident
about a wider ruling, then they should issue it. By doing so, they reduce uncertainty, and
they do so (by hypothesis) without compromising other important values. But if judges
lack confidence in a wider ruling, the costs of uncertainty may be worth incurring. The
argument in Rasul involved the narrow questions the Court decided, not the broader ones
that have arisen in the aftermath of its decision. The most that can be said is that
government’s need for planning provides a cautionary note about narrow and shallow
rulings -- suggesting the need to be minimalist, so to speak, about minimalism itself. But
I hope that I have said enough to show that during war, a minimalist posture, of the sort
defined by the three principles, provides the best general orientation.
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Conclusion
I have attempted to outline and to evaluate three general approaches to conflicts
among civil liberty and national security: Liberty Maximalism, National Security
Maximalism, and minimalism. Courts are most unlikely to adopt Liberty Maximalism,
and for good reason. The extent of liberty depends, in large part, on the strength and the
legitimacy of the reasons for intruding on it, and when national security is genuinely at
risk, the legitimate reasons for intruding on liberty are stronger. Of course courts should
strike down indefensible restrictions on constitutional rights, above all freedom of
speech.287 But where the founding document leaves gaps and ambiguities, judicial
caution is entirely appropriate amidst war.
By contrast, National Security Maximalism might seem highly attractive to
reviewing courts, and there are strong arguments on its behalf. More than anyone else,
the President is in a strong position to protect the country, because he is uniquely wellequipped to acquire relevant information, and because he can act both in a coordinated
way and with dispatch. These points are closing connected with central ideas about the
executive branch in the founding era.288 For their part, judges lack the information that
would permit them to make sensible judgments about when an intrusion on liberty is
justified, and the costs of judicial errors in the direction of liberty may turn out to be
catastrophic. Notably, National Security Maximalism has received some strong
endorsements on federal courts of appeals amidst the war on terrorism.
Notwithstanding its attractions, National Security Maximalism cannot claim much
support in the Constitution itself. The founding document carefully divides authority
between the President and Congress. It does not give a general “war power” to the
President. With respect to war, the Constitution is easily read to give the national
legislation the primary role. In addition, National Security Maximalism neglects
institutional factors that create a grave risk that the executive branch will support
unjustified intrusions on civil liberties. Group polarization is a significant danger,
particularly for a branch specifically designed to consist of like-minded people. As a
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result, the executive might well support interferences with freedom that are not
adequately justified by security concerns. This is especially likely if those interferences
affect identifiable groups rather than the public as a whole.
In the face of the relevant risks, the best general orientation is a particular form of
minimalism, with its three principal requirements, representing a kind of Due Process
Writ Large. First, Congress should be required to provide clear authorization for
executive intrusions on interests that have a strong claim to constitutional protection.
Second, some kind of hearing should be required before the executive deprives people of
their freedom. Third, courts should discipline themselves through narrow, incompletely
theorized rulings. To a remarkable degree, these three ideas capture the practices of the
Supreme Court in dealing with claimed violations of constitutional rights when national
security has been threatened. Minimalism can find prominent endorsement during the
Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the contemporary war on
terrorism.
In numerous cases, the Court, and its most celebrated members, have adopted a
form of minimalism in war. To be sure, minimalist decisions are unlikely to do all that
should be done to prevent unjustified intrusions into the domain of liberty. But such
decisions have the significant advantage of carving out a role that is admirably wellsuited to the institutional strengths and weaknesses of the federal judiciary.
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